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IFLA s Functional Requirements for Bibliographic Records (FRBR) is a model of the bibliographic 
universe. Although initially its application to the digital world appears to be straightforward, upon 
closer examination puzzles arise. One is that within the digital world it is surprisingly difficult to say 
exactly what FRBR items really are. On the one hand, the ontological candidates for items (concrete 
physical states of the computing system) are rarely identified and treated as items in practice   even 
though they may indeed be affirmed as items in theoretical discussions. On the other hand, objects 
that manifestly fail to meet the basic ontological criteria for FRBR items are commonly treated as if 
they are items. We describe this situation and, based on a re-factoring of FRBR into a set of roles 
(relationships) rather than a set of entity types, explore two possible resolutions. One, favored by the 
second author, is consistent with the ontology implicit in the original FRBR vision, but allows 
assignment of item attributes and roles to things that are not items; the other, favored by the first 
author, is a radical departure from the underlying FRBR ontology, but preserves the original attribute 
assignments and roles. 
FRBR
The Functional Requirements for Bibliographic Records (FRBR) is a  conceptual model of the bibliographic 
universe  (IFLA 1998). The FRBR Group 1 entity types are work, expression, manifestation, and item. Works 
are characterized as  a distinct intellectual or artistic creation , expressions as  the intellectual or artistic 
realization of a work in the form of alphanumeric, musical, or choreographic notation...  (a particular text for 
instance), manifestations as  the physical embodiment of an expression  (an edition for instance), and items as 
 a single exemplar of a manifestation . Appropriate attributes are assigned to each entity, for instance a work 
might have a genre, an expression a language, a manifestation a typeface, and an item a condition. Works, 
expressions, and manifestations are abstract objects, items are concrete physical things.
The Concept of an Item in the Digital World1
Conceptualizations of the bibliographic universe vary in the number of bibliographic kinds they recognize as 
entities (Svenonius 2000; IFLA 1998), but in every case they include an entity that corresponds to the FRBR 
item. That is, an entity which is a concrete physical object that in some sense records or carries information. 
Upon reflection, the importance of items is obvious: for one thing, one of the main functions of a traditional 
library is to collect, house, maintain, and distribute items. And while information itself may be abstract, as long 
as we are material beings in a material world, it would seem that that without physical items there can be no 
recording, communication, or reception, of information. It is not surprising that the analysis of the nature of the 
item figures prominently in the classic discussions of foundational issues in LIS (e.g., Buckland 1997; Buckland 
1998).
So what in digital libraries (or repositories, archives, etc.) corresponds to the FRBR item? There is no new 
puzzle about what are works in the digital world, as these are the very same conceptual things that are works 
in the wider analog world.  The identification of expressions and manifestations is perhaps somewhat more 
challenging (Renear et al 2003), but does not seem to profoundly challenge the spirit of the FRBR framework. 
The case of item however is more difficult. Some of these issues were raised by Buckland (1998), but the 
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specific problem below has so far received little attention.
Items as Patterned Matter and Energy in the Computer System
In addition to the definition given above FRBR characterizes an item as follows:
The entity defined as item is a concrete entity.  It is in many instances a single, physical object (e.g., 
a copy of a one-volume monograph, a single audio cassette, etc.). (IFLA 1998 23)
In most scenarios of information use in the digital world there is no visible, discrete, concrete physical object 
comparable to a copy of a book. Nevertheless, we can infer the existence of an entity that seems an 
appropriate candidate for classification as an item: individual physical states of the relevant portions of the 
computing system. We will refer to these physical states as instances of patterned matter and energy (PME)2. 
However the identification of items as PMEs is challenged by the fact that in the digital world individual PMEs 
are rarely assigned any of the important attributes (such as provenance, identifier, or condition) and 
relationships that FRBR items supposedly can have (IFLA 1998, 48-50, 63-82). 
It may not be apparent at first why we do not speak of, for instance, the provenance of a PME. After all, we 
speak of digital objects as being transferred from one place to another, one server to another, etc. But it is not 
usually the case that a particular concrete PME is being moved from one place to another (as it would be if we 
shipped a compact disk through the US Mail). Rather, a PME that exists in one place is used to create a copy 
(which is another PME) elsewhere. This suggests why PMEs, although they are natural candidates for items in 
virtue of their status as concrete physical objects and their role in physically instantiating information, are not 
usually identified as first class bibliographic objects in digital contexts. Not only are PMEs perceptually distant 
and, to most users, obscure, but also individuating distinct PMEs, whose periods of existence are often very 
short and difficult to ascertain, seems irrelevant to bibliographic control in the digital world (though not to other 
concerns of digital librarians, such as, most obviously, material preservation). Similarly we believe that a 
careful analysis of other common item-level attributes, such as item identifier, condition, etc., will also reveal 
that these are rarely applied, strictly speaking, to a PME, but rather to some related abstract object, perhaps 
corresponding manifestation or expression.
Items as Files
If PMEs are not treated as items in the digital world, then what is? What has a provenance, an item identifier, 
was copied, was transferred from one place to another? The answer often appears to be a file.   Where did this 
file come from?  asks a digital librarian in a forensic mood, and continues:  please make a copy of it  or  move 
it to the H-Drive  and so on. Files, it seems, are item-like. But what is a file?
The answer to this question is not obvious.  There are patterns of practice and discourse around the word  file  
but it is far from clear whether there is a single univocal concept behind them, much less what that concept is. 
Of course, within particular contexts (operating systems, data structure theory, etc.) there are exact definitions 
of  file , but those are of little help here: we wish to know what a file is in the sense in which the term is actually 
used by digital librarians and users. Several possibilities suggest themselves.  The first is that a file is an 
abstract object, a sequence of bits or characters   which is clear enough, but would make the rhetoric of 
creation, destruction, location and such metaphorical and blur the distinction between item and manifestation. 
Another is that files are logical fictions such as the  the average plumber , which raises the question of what 
entities will be involved in their explication. A third is that a file is a  free standing  social object, like a debt or a 
corporation (Smith 1993), but the nature of such social objects is controversial.
Interlude: Refactoring FRBR Types as Roles
Following Renear and Dubin (2007) we see expressions, manifestations, and items not as fundamental types 
of entities, but as roles that certain other entities take on under certain circumstances of linguistic convention 
and social intention, much as described in Searle (1995). So, in the right social circumstances, symbol  
sequences are expressions, physical kinds are manifestations, and physical objects are items.3 This revision of 
FRBR solves some puzzles of entity assignment (Renear et al 2003), better conforms to current best practice 
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in ontology design (Guarino & Welty 2000), and provides a useful framework for comparing two quite different 
resolutions of the problem of the item in the digital world.
Solution A: Items in the digital realm really are PMEs
This solution maintains that a fundamental aspect of being an item is being a concrete physical thing that 
provides the material substrate for the instantiation of manifestations, expressions, and works. Therefore items 
in the digital world must be PMEs just as FRBR claims. More specifically, items are PMEs in the role of 
exemplifying a manifestation that embodies an expression that realizes a work. It is true that, in the digital 
world, items will in many respects not be as prominent, nor function in exactly the same way, as items as 
envisioned by FRBR. In particular, they may have only a few of the assigned attributes or relations. According 
to this solution, however, those attributes and relations are not essential to the role of being an item.
What about the fact that FRBR item attributes or similar properties are routinely used to characterize other 
things, such as, files? Solution A holds that files in this sense are, for the most part, logical fictions (like the 
average plumber), and the locutions in which they figure are, for the most part, metaphors. There is no entity 
whatsoever which was sent when a  file  is  sent , no entity that is moved when a  file  is  moved , and no 
entity which is  compressed  when a  file  is  compressed . Such locutions are convenient, even necessary for 
efficient conversation about things digital, but underneath these fictions, metaphors, and polysemy, is a real 
structure of material things, general abstractions, and socially determined roles as described in the refactored 
version of FRBR
Solution B: Items in the digital realm are files
This solution holds that items are the things, whatever their nature (physical, abstract, or metaphorical), which 
play the role in bibliographic control that FRBR assigns to items. In this account, the relevant item-specific 
attributes and relations are what define the role of being an item. FRBR itself provides such an account: 
Defining item as an entity enables us to separately identify individual copies of a manifestation, and 
to describe those characteristics that are unique to that particular copy and that pertain to 
transactions such as circulation, etc. involving that copy. 
Defining the entity called item also enables us to draw relationships between individual copies of 
manifestations. (IFLA 1998, 23)
This approach holds that the fundamental nature of any FRBR entity is the role it plays in bibliographic control, 
not its ontological status. And in the case of most commonly used computing systems, the thing that fills the 
role of the FRBR item is the  file . If we insist on calling PMEs items, then we will need to develop a new role 
(or entity) that is neither item nor manifestation and which has the attributes currently assigned to items; this 
new bibliographic construct will correspond to the common conception of a file. Otherwise the model will not 
reflect practice.
What does this solution say about the fact that the concept of file seems poorly defined? It declines to make a 
formal definition of a  file . It is sympathetic to the  file as social object  approach, but rejects this view as too 
deterministic clearly, a programmer may have a different definition of  file  than a novice computer user. 
However, since the term  file  with its multiple interpretations allows communication between people who hold 
different definitions, it is a classic boundary object (Star & Griesemer 1989). The exact ontological nature of a 
boundary object may be mysterious, but the benefit is that they can be functionally used as a black box i.e., 
assumed to be an entity (or an entity playing a role). This approach reflects Wittgenstein s view that words do 
not have definitions, they only have uses: the meanings of the terms in our bibliographic and information 
processing vocabularies are fully constituted by how we use those terms in our every-day speech, thoughts, 
and actions.
Conclusions
The initial source of this puzzle is that the FRBR account of the item entity combines two families of features 
3
that appear to be necessarily coextensive, but that in fact vary independently, at least in the digital world: items 
are physical objects that carry information and items are the things which have certain attributes and 
relationships relative to bibliographic control. In order for FRBR to be effectively applied in the digital world, 
these two families of features need to be distinguished and reanalyzed. We have described two approaches to 
this. Of course the specific strategy chosen to support system design and standards integration will be a 
question of pragmatics, intuition, and social agreement; our purpose here is to point out the conceptual 
implications of the different approaches.
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1
 We use  digital world  as it is commonly used, to indicated the practices, tools, and policies 
associated with modern electronic digital computing, ignoring for the moment the more accurate 
distinctions that might be made between pairs such as digital/analog, physical/abstract, 
electronic/mechanical, real/virtual, etc.
2
 The phrase  patterned matter and energy , deftly coined by Dave Dubin, refers to any arbitrary 
concrete physical phenomenon, without being specific as to what kind of phenomenon it is (matter, 
energy, some combination of the two, or some particular material event). The phrase emphasizes, by 
using the adjective  patterned  rather than the noun  patterns of&   that the entity referred to is, 
whatever else it may be, an individual concrete instance and not a repeatable abstraction.
3
 For instance, in the right social circumstances, some combination of ink and paper is an item, or part 
of one; in other circumstances it is an accident.
